FG Speaks On Why NIN-SIM Linkage Hasn’t Ended Kidnapping, Terrorism

The mandatory National Identification Number-SIM connection, which was implemented by the federal government in 2020, was hailed as a game-changer in Nigeria’s battle against insecurity.

Authorities thought that by connecting each SIM card to a verified identification, anonymous communications used by criminals would be eliminated.
But six years later, terrorist attacks and kidnapping for ransom continue to rank among the nation’s greatest security threats, sparking a fresh discussion about the NIN-SIM policy’s effectiveness in preventing crime.

The conversation reappeared after Abisoye Coker-Odusote, Director-General of the National identification Management Commission (NIMC), clarified why, despite the nation’s growing digital identification infrastructure, terrorists and kidnappers are not always traceable.

During a monitored appearance on Sunday Politics on Channels Television, Coker-Odusote stated that thieves often thwart investigations by utilizing their victims’ cell phones rather than their own registered lines.

“We already know that the NIN is the fundamental identity for the security architecture, but you often learn that the kidnappers use the victims’ phones.” “So, since they aren’t using their own phones, how can you track them?” she asked.

She added that Nigeria’s identity database might not even contain all of the criminal components involved in abduction operations.

According to a belief, it’s likely that these kidnappers are not Nigerians and are brought into the nation 48 or 72 hours before a kidnapping occurs with the express intent of doing so. They would obviously not be included in our database if that were the case, but I’m not making any assumptions,” she continued.

The remarks have rekindled concerns about whether the NIN-SIM linkage has surpassed the capabilities that the system was intended to provide.

The Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC) and NIMC launched the NIN-SIM linking exercise to improve identity management, do away with anonymous SIM ownership, and bolster national security.

Millions of customers linked their SIM cards to their NIDs as a result of the exercise over time, while telecom companies also deleted millions of lines that did not adhere to legal requirements.

The NCC had previously insisted that the policy’s objectives were to increase identity verification, support security agencies in criminal investigations, and enhance the integrity of Nigeria’s SIM registration database.

The exercise is a crucial part of the nation’s framework for national security and the digital economy, according to the regulator.

Telecommunications companies have always insisted that they are not in charge of tracking criminals, even though they are essential to the NIN-SIM linkage policy’s implementation.

Gbenga Adebayo, the Chairman of the Association of Licensed Telecommunications Operators of Nigeria (ALTON), repeatedly clarified during the exercise’s nationwide execution that telecom operators only carry out the NCC’s directives, with the NIMC handling identity verification and validation.

He claims that although operators provide subscriber data for verification, the NIMC platform is where National Identification Number authentication actually takes place. Before impacted subscribers can be cleared, operators rely on NIMC’s responses in cases of delays or unsuccessful validations.

Adebayo had also mentioned that the main goal of the NIN-SIM harmonization operation was to prevent the usage of anonymously registered phone lines for illicit activities while also sanitizing the subscriber database by guaranteeing that every active SIM is linked to a verified person.

His stance emphasized the difference between identifying the person behind a SIM card and security organizations’ duty to look into crimes using telecoms data and accessible intelligence.

The NIMC’s most recent explanation supported the commission’s long-held belief that the NIN is essentially an identity management system rather than a stand-alone surveillance platform, even if it also acknowledged some of the practical constraints facing investigators.

Numerous public and commercial sector activities, such as banking, passport applications, driver’s license processing, telecommunications services, and access to other government programs, rely on the National Identification Number as a distinct digital identity.

Coker-Odusote asserts that cooperation between security agencies, telecom companies, and other pertinent organizations is just as important to the system’s ability to prevent crime as identification verification.

Rotimi Akapo, a telecommunications lawyer and regulatory specialist, agrees, saying that assumptions regarding the NIN-SIM coupling have frequently been misinterpreted.

Akapo claims that rather than acting as a stand-alone remedy for Nigeria’s security issues, the project was mainly created to address an identity verification issue by making sure each SIM card is associated with a verifiable individual.

He stated that although the policy increases accountability within the telecommunications ecosystem, identity theft, fraudulently registered SIM cards, proxy registrations, and other vulnerabilities can still be exploited by criminals if security agencies are unable to use available intelligence effectively. “NIN-SIM linkage solves an identity problem, not a crime problem,” he said.

His perspective is in line with the overarching goal of the Identification for Development (ID4D) initiative, which is funded by the World Bank. ID4D defines digital identification as the fundamental infrastructure that allows individuals to demonstrate their identity in order to obtain services from the public and private sectors. In such perspective, security is not the only goal of the national identity system, but rather one of several use cases.

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The remarks support the claim that although the NIN-SIM linkage has greatly improved subscriber identity verification, successful criminal investigations require efficient cooperation between telecom companies, security agencies, and other organizations within Nigeria’s security architecture.

The most recent explanation is given in the context of ongoing kidnapping cases in various regions of the nation despite the NIN-SIM policy’s widespread application.

The required connection initiative led many Nigerians to believe that it would be simpler to locate and capture criminals who use mobile phones to negotiate ransom payments.

Security operations, however, are frequently more intricate.

Subscriber records would naturally identify the victim rather than the abductor if kidnappers used the victims’ phones for ransom discussions. In these circumstances, investigators must integrate operational capabilities and other intelligence techniques with identify information.

Similarly, without more comprehensive security and immigration intelligence, the NIN by itself cannot verify the identities of members of criminal networks who are not registered in Nigeria’s identification database.

The National Identification Number is intended to serve as Nigeria’s primary digital identity system, going beyond security.

Foundational identification systems are platforms that allow people to safely prove who they are in order to access public and private sector services, according to the World Bank-backed Identification for Development (ID4D) program, which has aided Nigeria’s growth in digital identity.

In Nigeria, identity verification in banking, telecommunications, passport applications, tax administration, social intervention programs, and other government services is now largely dependent on the NIN. Instead of being the platform’s only goal, security is one of several use cases that are planned for it.

The effectiveness of the NIN-SIM linkage in combating kidnapping or terrorism ultimately depends on how well identity information is integrated with law enforcement, intelligence gathering, and other national security systems, according to this broader mandate, even though it can strengthen accountability by linking each active SIM card with a verified identity.

The government’s recent initiatives show that the identification ecosystem is still changing.

President Bola Tinubu, who views digital identification as essential to planning, governance, and service delivery, has instructed NIMC to expedite the enrollment of Nigerians in the national identity database.

Coker-Odusote claims that the commission is bolstering biometric verification throughout government services and increasing membership through partnerships under the Identification for Development (ID4D) initiative, which is funded by the World Bank. Additionally, she revealed that during SIM registration, telecom providers now instantly verify facial biometrics against the NIMC database.

The most recent discussion draws attention to a crucial distinction between identity management and crime prevention as Nigeria works to improve its digital public infrastructure.

Anonymous SIM ownership has decreased and subscriber identification verification has been greatly enhanced by the NIN-SIM linkage. However, the continued prevalence of kidnapping indicates that sophisticated criminal activity cannot be eradicated by digital identification alone.

Instead, how well identification information is integrated with intelligence collection, telecommunications data, law enforcement activities, and other components of Nigeria’s larger security architecture will ultimately determine how effective it is.